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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants 
have appealed the denial of their motions to dismiss on absolute 
and qualified immunity grounds.  These appeals were first heard 
by a panel of this court, which was bound by Prisco v. United 
States Dep't of Justice, 851 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
 
 
denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989).  In that case it was held that a 
defendant may not appeal the denial of a claim of qualified 
immunity under the collateral order doctrine if the defendant 
would nevertheless be required to go to trial on a claim for 
injunctive relief.  When the panel opinion was circulated to the 
full court before publication, the court voted to grant rehearing 
in banc for the purpose of reconsidering Prisco.  Having done so, 
the full court has decided that Prisco should be overruled.  Part 
IIB of this opinion, which represents the opinion of the court 
sitting in banc, addresses that issue.  The issues addressed in 
the remainder of this opinion have been considered by the panel 
only. 
 In still another chapter in the extensive volume of 
litigation between Frank Acierno and the members of the New 
Castle County Council ("County Council") in Delaware concerning 
Acierno's various development projects, we are called upon to 
decide whether the members of the County Council are entitled to 
immunity from suit for their actions of enacting two ordinances 
which down-zoned Acierno's commercial property.  We conclude that 
both the present and former members of the County Council are 
immune from suit because the actions they took with respect to 
Acierno's commercial property were either substantively and 
procedurally legislative in nature, or did not abrogate a clearly 
established property interest.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
district court's denial of the motion for summary judgment made 
by the present and former members of the County Council on 
immunity grounds.  We will also reverse the district court's 
 
 
order denying First Assistant County Attorney Mitchell's motion 
to dismiss on immunity grounds. 
 
 I. 
 A. Factual Background 
 Plaintiff Frank E. Acierno, a real estate developer, 
purchased a thirty-eight acre parcel of land located in New 
Castle County, Delaware (the "property") on October 5, 1984 for 
slightly more than $1,000,000.  As of April, 1971, the property 
had a classification under New Castle County's zoning ordinance 
as a "diversified planned unit development" ("DPUD").  A major 
land development plan for the property was approved by the County 
and recorded on April 11, 1974.  The approved record development 
plan provided for the construction of a 322 unit apartment 
complex (to be called "The Maples Apartments"), together with the 
development of .87 acres of land for commercial use. 
 It is undisputed that Acierno's interest in owning the 
property was partly by reason of its DPUD zoning classification 
and the fact that the property was the subject of an approved 
record development plan.  Before closing on the property, Acierno 
sought and received assurances from the New Castle County 
Department of Planning ("Department of Planning") regarding the 
current zoning and record plan status of the property.  In 
response to Acierno's request, the Department of Planning issued 
a letter opinion which stated the following: "The land is still 
currently zoned Diversified Planned Unit Development (DPUD).  The 
status of the record plan is that it is current and, therefore, 
 
 
the uses permitted are noted on the plan subject to limitations 
regarding the density, commercial area, etc."  Appendix ("App.") 
(No. 93-7456) at 131.  In reliance on these factors, Acierno paid 
a premium of approximately $900,000 for the property.  At the 
time of purchase, the description of the property specifically 
noted that the parcel had been approved by County officials for 
the construction of 322 apartment units. 
 In October, 1985, Acierno filed with the Department of 
Planning a revised development plan for the property, which was 
now to be known as the "Westhampton project."  Thereafter, in 
December, 1985, the County Council issued a resolution pursuant 
to section 23-81(21) of the County Code1 requesting that the 
Department of Planning provide a recommendation as to whether the 
existing record plan for the property should be voided.  The 
County Council issued this resolution based on concerns that DPUD 
rezonings were not being developed in a timely fashion, that the 
density of housing might adversely impact on the general quality 
of life in the County, that an updated review of traffic, water, 
                     
1.  Then County Code § 23-81(21) provided in relevant part as 
follows: 
 
 If construction has not been completed within . . . five (5) 
years after the date of approval of the record 
development plan for the [planned unit development 
("PUD")] or the date of approval of the record 
development plan of the last stage of PUD, if submitted 
in stages, whichever is longer, then the approval shall 
be voidable at the discretion of county council, upon 
recommendation of the department of planning. 
 
New Castle County, Del., Code § 23-81(21) (repealed 1987); App. 
(No. 93-7456) at 355. 
 
 
and sewer facilities was necessary, and that the Subdivision 
Advisory Committee should review the project in light of the 
character of the existing neighborhood.  The record reflects that 
the project was the only DPUD-zoned property with a record 
development plan subject to review by the County. 
 In response to the resolution, the Department of 
Planning solicited comments from various municipal departments 
and determined that the property had adequate traffic, water, and 
sewer capacity.  Therefore, the Department of Planning did not 
make a recommendation that the County Council void the record 
development plan.  Two months later, the then Council Attorney 
sent a memorandum to the County Council pertaining to the 
resolution.  The memo stated that there was nothing more for the 
County Council to consider since the voiding provision of the New 
Castle County Code, § 23-81(21), "indicates that the [Department 
of Planning] must affirmatively support the voiding of a record 
plan before Council's discretion comes into being.  Without such 
prerequisite support, Council has no discretion to act.  If this 
were not the case, review by the [Department of Planning] would 
be meaningless."  App. (No. 93-7456) at 140. 
 On March 11, 1986, then County Council President Karen 
Peterson informed Acierno that nothing remained for the County 
Council to consider regarding the resolution and that no further 
ordinances or resolutions had been proposed concerning the 
property.  Acierno then undertook a revision of the subdivision 
 
 
plan2 for the property to address concerns raised by the County 
regarding the planned use for the site.  The Department of 
Planning informed Acierno that his revised and updated 
subdivision plan for the Westhampton project was approved and 
recorded on April 18, 1986.  A subsequent revised subdivision 
plan, superseding the April plan, was approved and recorded on 
December 5, 1986.   
 During 1987 the County Council revised, updated, and 
amended the DPUD zoning classification.  At the time a workshop 
concerning the zoning amendment effort was held in October, 1987, 
the proposed amended DPUD ordinance contained a "savings clause" 
which provided as follows: 
 Section 4.  This ordinance shall become effective 
immediately upon its adoption and approval except for 
rezoning applications currently pending DPUD approval 
which shall be exempt from the provisions of this 
ordinance, but subject to the provisions of the Code in 
effect at the time of rezoning to DPUD. 
App. (No. 93-7456) at 92.  This proposed DPUD ordinance, known as 
"Substitute Ordinance No. 1 to Ordinance 87-025," was not enacted 
into law.  In response to suggestions made during the workshop, 
the savings clause was revised to read as follows: 
 Section 4.  This ordinance shall become effective 
immediately upon its adoption and approval except for 
rezoning applications currently pending DPUD approval 
which shall be exempt from the provisions of this 
ordinance except Section 23-81(18), but subject to the 
provisions in the Code in effect at the time of 
rezoning to DPUD. 
                     
2.  The County Code distinguishes between a "record plan" and 
major and minor "subdivision plans."  See New Castle County, 
Del., Code § 20-3 (defining these terms). 
 
 
App. (No. 93-7456) at 113 (emphasis added).3  This revised DPUD 
ordinance, known as "Substitute Ordinance No. 2 to Ordinance 87-
025," was adopted into law by the County Council on October 13, 
1987.  Id. at 93, 113.  The language of the savings clause is 
relevant to this dispute because Acierno alleges that the County 
Council, through an opinion issued by First Assistant County 
Attorney Michael T. Mitchell, relied upon the unenacted version 
to conclude that it had discretion to void Acierno's record 
development plan. 
 In 1988, Acierno further revised the Westhampton 
project subdivision plan and submitted it for County review.  In 
June, 1988, the Department of Planning informed Acierno that the 
subdivision plan, superseding the December 5, 1986 subdivision 
plan, was approved and recorded.  By December, 1988 when a 
further revised subdivision plan was approved and recorded, 
Acierno had spent in excess of $1,000,000 to further his 
development plans for the property, including expenses for 
mortgage interest, engineering fees, and real estate taxes.  It 
is not disputed, however, that Acierno never obtained a building 
                     
3.  Current County Code § 23-81(18) allows a landowner with DPUD-
zoned property 10 years from the date of the original rezoning 
ordinance to develop the parcel as proposed.  If the property has 
not been fully developed at the end of the 10 year sunsetting 
period, the landowner must submit current support facilities 
information establishing the adequacy of these facilities in the 
opinion of the Department of Planning in order to continue with 
the development as approved.  New Castle County, Del., Code § 23-
81(18).  This provision replaced former County Code § 23-81(21), 
which provided a five year window after the date of the approval 
of the PUD record development plan before the County Council had 
discretion to void the record plan.  Id. § 23-81(21) (repealed 
1987); see supra note 1. 
 
 
permit from the County allowing him to start construction of the 
Westhampton project. 
 The County Council again introduced a resolution in 
April, 1991 requesting the Department of Planning's 
recommendation whether to void the existing record development 
plan for the property.  The record reflects that the County 
Council had concerns similar to those present when a voiding 
resolution had been introduced in December, 1985.  Acting upon 
this resolution and enclosing a copy of the December, 1988 
subdivision plan, the then Director of the Department of Planning 
contacted the Delaware Department of Transportation for comments 
concerning road access and traffic impact. 
 In a memorandum to the County Council dated May 22, 
1991, the then Director advised the County Council that 
Subdivision Advisory Committee members had been asked to comment 
on the Westhampton project and to identify any issues that might 
preclude development of the site as depicted by the record 
development and subdivision plans.  The memo stated that various 
government agencies had identified deficiencies in the 
subdivision plan, but acknowledged that the situation could be 
remedied by Acierno through voluntary revisions to the plan.  In 
fact, Acierno responded to the Department of Planning by letter 
dated May 29, 1991 that he intended to cooperate in order to 
address and resolve any deficiencies.  By June, 1991, Acierno had 
submitted a wetlands delineation report, thereby fulfilling one 
of the cited deficiencies. 
 
 
 Defendant-appellant Michael T. Mitchell, First 
Assistant County Attorney, was also involved in reviewing the 
voiding resolution proposed in April, 1991.  He provided a legal 
memorandum to the County Council on July 2, 1991 which set forth 
his opinion as to whether the Council had authority to void 
Acierno's approved record development plan.  Mitchell's opinion 
concluded that the County Council had discretion to void the 
record development plan for the Westhampton project upon 
recommendation by the Department of Planning because the old 
five-year sunsetting provision of the County Code, repealed § 23-
81(21), applied rather than the newly enacted ten-year sunsetting 
provision, § 23-81(18).  In coming to this conclusion, Mitchell 
relied upon the unenacted savings clause contained in Substitute 
Ordinance No. 1 to Ordinance 87-025, rather than the enacted 
savings clause which was introduced as part of Substitute No. 2 
to that ordinance. 
 From May, 1991 through April, 1992 Acierno proceeded 
with his development efforts by attempting to remedy the 
purported deficiencies in the Westhampton plan.  Some changes in 
the proposed development were incorporated into a revised plan 
which was submitted to the Department of Planning for review and 
approval.  The Department of Planning allegedly informed Acierno 
in September, 1991 that he had complied with all material 
deficiencies contained in the May 22, 1991 memorandum from the 
Department of Planning to the County Council.  The County Council 
tabled the resolution to void Acierno's record development plan 
in September, 1991. 
 
 
 The resolution was reexamined the next Spring.  In a 
letter to the County Council dated April 2, 1992, the Department 
of Planning indicated that Acierno had submitted a new 
subdivision plan which resolved the wetlands, fire prevention, 
and a majority of the public works concerns.  The traffic and 
road access issues were the only remaining deficiencies that had 
not been completely resolved.  The Department of Planning 
concluded: 
 In summary, it would appear that the only remaining 
issue with respect to our memorandum of May 22, 1991, 
is access through the Oakwood Hills subdivision.  The 
Department has been given no indication that the 
applicant will voluntarily remove this access from the 
plan.  Further, we see no evidence that any meaningful 
dialogue is ongoing between the applicant and community 
to find a compromise position.  Should [the County] 
Council be of the opinion that this issue warrants 
voiding of the plan, the Department would recommend 
that it proceed with action on [the voiding resolution] 
as this appears to be the only method of bringing 
closure on this issue. 
App. (No. 93-7456) at 39. 
 After notice and a public hearing, on April 14, 1992 
the County Council enacted Ordinance 91-190 voiding the approved 
record development plan and related subdivision plans for the 
property.  The next day, defendant-appellant Philip Cloutier, 
then a member of the County Council, informed the Director of 
Planning that he intended to introduce an ordinance to rezone the 
property from DPUD back to R-2, its residential zoning 
classification prior to its rezoning to DPUD in 1971.  As 
required by statute, legal notice of the proposed zoning 
ordinance was published on June 20, 1992; below the title of the 
 
 
proposed ordinance contained in the notice was bracketed language 
indicating that enactment would rezone the property from DPUD to 
an R-2 zoning classification. 
 A statutorily required public hearing was held before 
the Department of Planning and Planning Board on July 7, 1992 
concerning the proposed rezoning ordinance.  Two weeks later, the 
Department of Planning recommended the adoption of a substitute 
ordinance which would rezone the property from DPUD to an R-1-B 
classification instead of an R-2 classification.  The R-1-B 
zoning classification, which requires an average minimum lot size 
of 15,000 square feet, is less restrictive than the R-2 zoning 
classification, which requires an average minimum lot size of 
21,780 square feet.  Compare New Castle County, Del., Code § 23-
39(3) (the R-1-B residence district requires a minimum lot area 
of 15,000 square feet) with id. § 23-39(6) (the R-2 residence 
district requires a one-half acre or 21,780 square feet minimum 
lot area). 
 On September 9, 1992 the County Council enacted 
Substitute No. 1 to Ordinance No. 92-119 rezoning the property 
from DPUD to an R-1-B zoning classification.  This action was 
taken even though all public notices concerning the rezoning had 
indicated that upon enactment the property would be rezoned from 
DPUD to an R-2 classification.  The effect of the rezoning was 
that Acierno had to suspend his plans to develop a large 
apartment building on the property because the R-1-B zoning 
classification permits only a variety of less intensive uses.  
 
 
The district court made a finding of fact that Acierno had spent 
more than $1,000,000 pursuing his plan to develop the property.4 
 
 B. Procedural Background 
 Acierno filed a complaint on July 1, 1992 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware alleging that 
the defendants, through the voiding of his approved record 
development plan and the rezoning of his property, violated his 
constitutional rights.  The original complaint named as 
defendants the County and present and former members of the 
County Council.5  The complaint was subsequently amended in 
April, 1993 to include First Assistant County Attorney Michael T. 
Mitchell as a party defendant. 
 The amended complaint contains two counts.  In count 
one, Acierno seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief 
against all defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Specifically, Acierno alleges that the defendants violated his 
equal protection and procedural and substantive due process 
rights by down-zoning his property.  In count two, Acierno seeks 
                     
4.  The district court did not clarify whether this figure of 
$1,000,000 includes the premium of $900,000 that it found Acierno 
paid for the property in reliance on the existing DPUD zoning 
classification and approved record development plan when he 
purchased the property in 1984.  In light of our disposition of 
these appeals, resolution of this factual ambiguity is not 
necessary and in no way impacts on our decision in this case. 
5.  The defendants who are presently serving as members of the 
County Council are Richard Cecil, Robert Woods, Christopher 
Roberts, Penrose Hollins, and Karen Venezky.  The defendants who 




injunctive relief against the County under an equitable estoppel 
theory. 
 The present and former County Council members had filed 
an answer to the original complaint in which they allege defenses 
of legislative and qualified immunity.  These defendants and the 
County filed a motion for summary judgment on December 4, 1992.  
After the filing of various motions and responses which are not 
relevant to this appeal, the district court made a determination 
to treat the motion by the defendants other than Mitchell as a 
motion for partial summary judgment.  In a Memorandum Opinion and 
Order dated June 9, 1993, the district court granted the motion 
for summary judgment on Acierno's procedural due process claim,6 
but denied the motion as to the substantive due process and equal 
protection claims.  See Acierno v. Cloutier, No. 92-385, 1993 WL 
215133, at *23-26 (D. Del. June 9, 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part, __ F.3d __, 1994 WL 319783 (3d Cir., Jul 07, 1994) (No. 93-
7456, 93-7617), vacated and reh'g in banc granted, __ F.3d __, 
1994 WL 401516 (3d Cir., Aug 04, 1994) (No. 93-7456, 93-7617).   
The district court also concluded that the defendants were not 
entitled to summary judgment with respect to their defenses of 
legislative and qualified immunity.  Id. at *27-30. 
                     
6.  Acierno has not cross-appealed the granting of the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the 
procedural due process claim, and thus, we have no occasion to 
address this theory of the complaint in this opinion or to 




 The district court separately addressed the defenses of 
legislative and qualified immunity.  The district court 
articulated a two-part test for entitlement to legislative 
immunity which requires that the action taken be legislative in 
nature rather than administrative, and that the action be taken 
in accordance with statutory procedures.  Id. at *27.  The court 
concluded that the enactment of the two ordinances which down-
zoned Acierno's property was administrative, rather than 
legislative, because the two ordinances were directed at a single 
property owner and not the community at large.  Id.  The court 
further held that the members of the County Council were not 
entitled to legislative immunity because they did not strictly 
comply with Delaware law when rezoning the property from DPUD to 
an R-1-B zoning classification.  Id. at *27-29. 
 Turning to the defense of qualified immunity, the 
district court concluded that because Acierno had a vested right 
to develop his property pursuant to the DPUD zoning 
classification and approved record plan, see id. at *9-19, which 
was clearly established by Delaware state law at the time of the 
rezoning decisions, no reasonable official would have believed 
that the rezoning actions were lawful.  Id. at *29.  In rejecting 
the qualified immunity defense, the district court also found 
that a reasonable official would have known that the voiding of 
the record plan was precluded by County law.  Id.  Thus, the 
district court decided that the members of the County Council 
were not entitled to immunity from suit. 
 
 
 Defendant Mitchell filed a motion to dismiss the 
amended complaint on the grounds that it fails to state 
cognizable due process and equal protection claims against him 
and that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.  The 
district court rejected Mitchell's motion to dismiss in a 
separate Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 1, 1993.  
Acierno v. Cloutier, No. 92-385, slip op. at 13-19 (D. Del. Sept. 
1, 1993).  Addressing the defense of qualified immunity, the 
district court denied Mitchell's motion because it found that 
Mitchell had knowingly, or through his own incompetence, relied 
on unadopted legislation when issuing his legal opinion as to 
whether the County Council had authority to void the approved 
record development plan.  Id., slip op. at 19-20. 
 
 II. 
 A. Jurisdiction of the District Court 
 Plaintiff Acierno filed this action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his 
constitutional rights by down-zoning his property.  Thus, the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the federal 
question claims by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  It had 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367.  In these appeals, the members of the County 
Council and defendant Mitchell contend that the district court 
improperly denied their motions to dismiss or for summary 




 B. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 Ordinarily we do not have appellate jurisdiction to 
review district court orders denying motions to dismiss or for 
summary judgment because there is no final order within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  W.D.D., Inc. v. Thornbury Township, 
850 F.2d 170, 171 (3d Cir.) (in banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 892, 109 S. Ct. 228 (1988).  The Supreme Court, however, 
has held that courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction under 
the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949), to consider 
whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from suit.  
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697-
98 (1982); see also Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 934 (3d 
Cir. 1992) ("Schrob II"); Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 
1406-07 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Schrob I").  This principle of appellate 
jurisdiction has been extended to orders rejecting a defendant's 
entitlement to qualified immunity from suit to the extent that 
the decision turns on issues of law.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 524-30, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2814-17 (1985); see also 
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1459-61 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 In adhering to this theory of appellate jurisdiction, 
we have recognized that an order denying a defense of immunity is 
reviewable before trial because entitlement to "immunity from 
federal claims encompasses not only immunity from liability, but 
also immunity from suit."  Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 
1105 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S. Ct. 2827 
(1991).  See also Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 
 
 
F.3d 1270, 1281 (3d Cir. 1993) (sovereign immunity is an immunity 
from trial), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994).  
The Supreme Court has instructed that the first step in reviewing 
a district court's qualified immunity decision is to determine 
whether the plaintiff has "allege[d] the violation of a clearly 
established constitutional right" at all.  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 
U.S. 226, __, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991); see also D.R. by L.R. 
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 
1368 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. 
Ct. 1045 (1993).  This threshold inquiry requires us to determine 
whether the constitutional right asserted by Acierno was 
"`clearly established' at the time the defendants acted," and 
whether Acierno "has asserted a violation of a constitutional 
right at all."  Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S. Ct. at 1793.7 
                     
7.  The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Siegert, when read as 
a whole, seems to suggest that where practicable or expedient an 
appellate court should first address whether the plaintiff has 
alleged a cognizable constitutional claim at all, before turning 
to the question of whether the constitutional right asserted was 
"clearly established" at the time the defendant acted.  500 U.S. 
at 232-33, 111 S. Ct. at 1793-94.  In fact, we have emphasized 
this aspect of the Siegert decision in a subsequent case where we 
decided to address all plaintiffs' allegations of constitutional 
error as a predicate question to whether the constitutional 
rights were "clearly established" at the time the defendant 
acted.  See D.R. by L.R., 972 F.2d at 1368.  Nevertheless, 
concurring in the judgment in Siegert, Justice Kennedy recognized 
that in certain cases, like the one before the Supreme Court in 
that case, it is an "altogether normal procedure" for the court 
of appeals to decide the case "on the ground that appear[s] to 
offer the most direct and appropriate resolution," 500 U.S. at 
235, 111 S. Ct. at 1795 (Kennedy, J, concurring in the judgment), 
which in difficult constitutional cases will sometimes be whether 
the constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time 
the defendant acted.  Furthermore, the majority opinion in 
Siegert does not state that courts of appeals must always as an 
initial inquiry address whether a constitutional violation has 
 
 
 The present case involves two appeals: (1) the 
defendants who are current and former members of the County 
Council have appealed the district court's order denying their 
motion for summary judgment insofar as the court rejected their 
defenses of legislative and qualified immunity from suit; and (2) 
defendant Mitchell has appealed the district court order denying 
his motion to dismiss insofar as the court rejected his defense 
of qualified immunity from suit.  Although all parties agree that 
we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to 
consider the issues of legislative and qualified immunity, they 
disagree on the scope of our appellate jurisdiction. 
 The Nixon case makes clear that we have appellate 
jurisdiction to consider whether the former members of the County 
Council are entitled to absolute legislative immunity.  457 U.S. 
at 741-43, 102 S. Ct. at 2697-98; see also Schrob I, 948 F.2d at 
(..continued) 
been alleged by the plaintiff.  In fact, in cases decided after 
both Siegert and D.R. by L.R., we have opted to address whether 
the constitutional right asserted was "clearly established" at 
the time the defendant acted, without initially deciding whether 
a constitutional violation was alleged at all.  See Rappa v. New 
Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1077-79 (3d Cir. 1994); Abdul-Akbar 
v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 201-05 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 In cases such as the present one, where the court would be 
required to undertake a detailed analysis of unreported and 
undeveloped state and county law issues in order to determine 
whether a cognizable constitutional claim was alleged at all, we 
believe a more prudent course is to first address whether the 
constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was "clearly 
established" at the time the defendant acted.  We will follow 
such a course in this case because, as will be explained infra, 
the state and county law issues which we would need to decide in 
order to determine whether Acierno possessed a vested right to 
develop his commercial property before the rezoning ordinances 
were passed are particularly difficult and undeveloped. 
 
 
1406-07; Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1985); 
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1207-09 (3d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S. Ct. 3147 (1981).  The scope of 
our jurisdiction to consider the issues of qualified immunity, 
and legislative immunity as concerns the present members of the 
County Council, is a more complex question, however, especially 
in light of the fact that Acierno seeks prospective injunctive 
relief against several of the defendants.  When deciding the 
appealability of qualified immunity issues in Mitchell, a case in 
which only monetary damages were sought, the Supreme Court 
expressly left open the question whether a case involving claims 
for injunctive relief would change the equation.  472 U.S. at 519 
n.5, 105 S. Ct. at 2812 n.5.  We subsequently addressed that 
question and held that the denial of a defendant's claim to 
entitlement to qualified immunity is not immediately appealable 
when the plaintiff has requested injunctive relief.  Prisco v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 851 F.2d 93, 95-96 (3d Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089, 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989). 
 As a result, plaintiff Acierno submits that we must 
dismiss these appeals insofar as they involve present County 
Council members Cecil, Woods, Roberts, Hollins, and Venezky, and 
First Assistant County Attorney Mitchell, because he seeks 
prospective injunctive relief against these parties.  With 
respect to former County Council members Cloutier and Powell, 
against whom it is impossible to obtain prospective injunctive 
relief, Acierno concedes that the order denying their motion for 
 
 
summary judgment on legislative and qualified immunity grounds is 
immediately appealable. 
 The present members of the County Council argue that 
Prisco was wrongly decided.  They bring to our attention the 
prevailing rule among all of our sister courts of appeals that, 
despite the existence of a request for injunctive relief, pre-
trial orders denying a defendant's entitlement to qualified 
immunity are immediately appealable.  See Burns v. County of 
Cambria, Pa., 971 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1992)(canvassing 
cases from the nine circuits which disagree with Prisco), cert. 
denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1049 (1993).  Defendants who are 
present members of the County Council insist that Prisco should 
be overruled because it undermines the policy rationale behind 
appeals where immunity was pled and, additionally, because of the 
ease with which the Prisco rule can be invoked to circumvent a 
defendant's right to an immediate appeal.  On the other hand, 
Acierno asserts that the long-standing policy of preventing 
piece-meal appeals still warrants adherence to the Prisco rule 
and that a careful review by the appellate courts of the request 
for injunctive relief would prevent any abuse of the rule by 
plaintiffs. 
 Since a panel does not have the occasion to reconsider 
a prior panel opinion and is bound to follow our precedent, it is 
only now, sitting in banc, that we may reexamine the rationale of 
Prisco.  See Internal Operating Procedures, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Rule 9.1 (prior reported 
opinions can be overruled only by the court sitting in banc).  In 
 
 
light of recent opinions which call into question the continued 
vitality of Prisco, we now consider whether the Prisco rule 
should meet its demise.  At stake in these proceedings is whether 
we should now hear the appeals of the present County Council 
members or, alternatively, dismiss their appeals for lack of an 
appealable order as they involve issues of whether these members 
(against whom injunctive relief is sought) are entitled to 
absolute or qualified immunity. 
 In Prisco, we recognized that a suit seeking both 
prospective relief and money damages does not end for a party 
successfully asserting a defense of either absolute or qualified 
immunity.8  Prisco, 851 F.2d at 96.  We observed that the policy 
                     
8.  Specifically, we held, "that in an action in which claims for 
prospective relief remain pending, a party against whom they 
remain pending may not appeal from the denial of a motion for 
summary judgment on immunity grounds."  Prisco, 851 F.2d at 96 
(footnote omitted).  Although the Prisco case did not explicitly 
involve an issue of absolute immunity, its holding extends to 
absolute as well as qualified immunity.  Defendants argue that we 
were incorrect in asserting such a broad proposition of law in 
light of Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United 
States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-34, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 1974-75 
(1980).  Defendants read Consumers Union as standing for the 
proposition that legislative immunity confers an immunity from 
suit for both injunctive relief as well as damages.  See also 
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 278, 110 S. Ct. 625, 633 
(1990) (indicating that it had been previously decided in 
Consumers Union that legislative immunity extends to actions for 
both damages and injunctive relief).  We note that the Supreme 
Court has never held that legislative immunity applies to both 
claims for damages and injunctive relief.  A close reading of 
Consumers Union indicates that the Supreme Court merely pointed 
to an obvious circuit split which existed at the time and, we 
believe, remains unresolved today.   There are at least two 
courts of appeals that have suggested that the Supreme Court has 
definitively spoken on this issue and has held that absolute 
immunity is a bar to injunctive relief.  See Risser v. Thompson, 
930 F.2d 549, 551 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 180 
(1991); Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906 F.2d 1100, 1102 (6th 
 
 
rationale for granting qualified immunity is that, "we do not 
want officials to make discretionary decisions with one wary eye 
on their pocketbook."  Prisco, 851 F.2d at 95.  We then concluded 
that such a rationale does not apply to suits for injunctive 
relief.  Id.  In our discussion, we balanced the marginal benefit 
to a government official from an interlocutory appeal on the 
issue of damages against the systemic harms of permitting piece-
meal interlocutory review of discrete issues in a case which will 
be ongoing.  Prisco, 851 F.2d at 96.  We must now reassess our 
prior analysis and determine whether the balance that existed at 
the time of Prisco is still valid today.      
 In Siegert v. Gilley, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
principle that "[o]ne of the purposes of immunity, absolute or 
qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted 
liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those 
defending a long drawn out lawsuit."  Siegert, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 
111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991).  We note that Prisco tends to 
minimize this strong public policy reason which favors 
jurisdiction over interlocutory immunity appeals. 
(..continued) 
Cir. 1990).  However, a substantial number of courts of appeals, 
including the Third Circuit, believe the issue is unresolved by 
the Supreme Court, and have held that absolute immunity is a bar 
to damages only, and not to prospective or injunctive relief.  
See Schrob II, 967 F.2d at 939 (3d Cir. 1992); Fry v. Melaragno, 
939 F.2d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 1991); Chrissy F. v. Mississippi 
Dep't of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1336 (1994); Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin 
County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
55 (1991); Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d 287, 292 (2nd Cir. 1989). 
 
 
 In Schrob II, this Court reviewed authority from other 
courts of appeals that struck the balance in favor of recognizing 
appellate jurisdiction even where injunctive relief claims are 
present.  The Schrob II panel noted that other courts of appeals 
have "criticized Prisco for qualitatively equating the burdens 
associated with defending against a suit for money damages with 
the burdens associated with defending a suit for injunctive 
relief."  Schrob II, 967 F.2d at 940.  See also Burns, 971 F.2d 
at 1020 (expressing "dissatisfaction with the Prisco rule").  As 
other courts have observed, even though injunctive relief claims 
may continue after appeal, "considerable differences [exist] in 
both time and expense in defending a case that involves both 
damages and equitable relief as contrasted to a case that 
involves equitable relief alone."  Young v. Lynch, 846 F.2d 960, 
962 (4th Cir. 1988).  See also DiMartini v. Ferrin, 889 F.2d 922, 
925 (9th Cir. 1989), amended, 906 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 501 U.S. 1204, 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1991).      
 As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
explained in Scott v. Lacy, 811 F.2d 1153, 1153-54 (7th Cir. 
1987), "a public official who is a defendant in a suit [for 
injunctive relief] is not `on trial' at all.  The suit seeks 
relief against him in his official capacity; he need not attend 
the trial, which will be conducted by attorneys representing the 
governmental body."  Indeed, a suit against elected officials in 




   The procedure dictated by Prisco undermines the reasons 
for recognizing qualified immunity -- to permit a public servant 
to concentrate on official duties without the distraction and 
worries which are the inevitable consequence of disruptive 
litigation.  While a defendant who loses a claim for injunctive 
relief is simply ordered to refrain from taking certain action in 
his or her official capacity, an official who is denied qualified 
immunity must be concerned with personal liability without the 
right of appeal, to which he or she would otherwise have been 
entitled.  See Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 306 
(6th Cir. 1986)("The exposure to personal liability in damages 
and the potential need for retention of private counsel to 
protect against that risk is quite different from the problem 
faced by an official who is charged only in an official 
capacity.").  
 The instant case highlights the inconsistency of the 
Prisco decision with the public policy furthered by interlocutory 
review of immunity determinations.  The former County Council 
members, who no longer have official duties that would be subject 
to disruption by the litigation, would be spared further 
involvement, while the present Council members would be forced to 
go forward with their official duties still burdened by the 
distraction and worries of the litigation.  This is directly 
contrary to the policy behind the immunity doctrine of protecting 
the present elected officials from suit and possible personal 
liability when making discretionary decisions.  Additionally, as 
noted in Schrob II, a plaintiff "can easily circumvent a 
 
 
defendant's right to immediate appeal simply by adding a claim 
for equitable relief."  Schrob II, 967 F.2d at 940. 
 We believe that a balancing approach similar to the one 
we used to decide Prisco still has merit today.  However, after 
carefully re-examining the policy and practical considerations of 
such a rule, we conclude that Prisco failed to give adequate 
weight to the benefits derived by public officials of being freed 
from the unpleasantries and demands on their time due to 
continued litigation.  Prisco also weighs too heavily the harms 
associated with interlocutory appeals.  We therefore overrule 
Prisco. 
 In addition to arguing that Prisco was wrongly decided, 
Mitchell also seeks to distinguish Prisco by arguing that Acierno 
has made no viable claim for injunctive relief against him.  
Assuming arguendo that a claim for injunctive relief was made 
against Mitchell, we nonetheless have appellate jurisdiction to 
consider whether Mitchell was entitled to dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds in light of the above discussion which overrules 
Prisco. 
 In sum, we have appellate jurisdiction to consider 
whether the present and former members of the County Council are 
entitled to absolute legislative and qualified immunity from 
suit.  We also have appellate jurisdiction to consider whether 
the district court erred in denying First Assistant County 
Attorney Mitchell's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity 
 
 
grounds.9  In our consideration of the qualified immunity issue 
as it relates to the substantive due process claim, we will first 
determine whether plaintiff Acierno has asserted a violation of a 
clearly established constitutional right at all. 
 
 III. 
 In this case we must decide whether the district court 
correctly denied the members of the County Council's motion for 
summary judgment on legislative and qualified immunity grounds, 
and First Assistant County Attorney Mitchell's motion to dismiss 
on qualified immunity grounds.  Because "[t]his appeal presents a 
purely legal question concerning the scope of the immunity 
doctrine," we exercise plenary review over the district court's 
denial of the summary judgment motion on legislative immunity 
grounds.  Donivan v. Dallastown Borough, 835 F.2d 486, 487 (3d 
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1035, 108 S. Ct. 1596 (1988). 
                     
9.  With these appeals, the defendants argue that the district 
court erred as a matter of law in failing to grant their motion 
for summary judgment as to Acierno's claim alleging a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It 
is not clear from the district court's opinion that the 
defendants argued that they are entitled to absolute legislative 
immunity or qualified immunity with respect to this allegation.  
Furthermore, in their brief submitted to this court the 
defendants did not argue that their immunity defenses also 
relieve them of liability on the equal protection claim.  
Accordingly, because our jurisdiction is limited to addressing 
the defenses of legislative and qualified immunity for the 
members of the County Council and Mitchell, we do not express any 
opinion concerning whether Acierno possesses a viable claim for a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause or whether there are 
immunity defenses for any of the defendants to such a claim. 
 
 
 We also exercise plenary review over the denial of the 
summary judgment motion and motion to dismiss on qualified 
immunity grounds because this issue presents a "purely legal" 
question.  Burns, 971 F.2d at 1020; Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 
67 (3d Cir. 1988).  To the extent that the district court 
interpreted state and county law in determining whether Acierno 
had a vested right to develop the property, the district court is 
not entitled to any deference.  Salve Regina College v. Russell, 
499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991); cf. Grimes v. 
Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Thus, the determinations regarding state and county law necessary 
to decide whether the defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity will be reviewed de novo.  Salve Regina College, 499 




 We first address the issue of whether the members of 
the County Council are entitled to absolute legislative immunity 
for their actions because in the event we agree with their 
position, such a ruling would obviate the need for evaluating 
their claim to entitlement to qualified immunity.  The Supreme 
Court has held that individual members of state legislatures are 
absolutely immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
when conducting legitimate legislative activity.  Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-79, 71 S. Ct. 783, 788-89 (1951).  
After the Supreme Court extended this protection of absolute 
 
 
immunity to regional legislators functioning in a capacity 
comparable to that of members of a state legislature, Lake 
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 
391, 402-06, 99 S. Ct. 1171, 1178-79 (1979), we further extended 
it to protect members of local legislative bodies for actions 
taken in a purely legislative capacity.  Aitchison v. Raffiani, 
708 F.2d 96, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Ryan v. Burlington 
County, N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1290 (3d Cir. 1989).10 
 The County Council, whose members are elected, is a 
local governmental body that has been given a combination of 
legislative and administrative powers.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 
9, §§ 1146, 4901 (1989).  "It is only with respect to the 
legislative powers delegated to them by the state legislatures 
that the members of local governing boards are entitled to 
absolute immunity."  Ryan, 889 F.2d at 1290.  Thus, our task in 
making this immunity determination requires us to examine whether 
the members of the County Council were acting in an 
administrative or legislative capacity when they enacted the 
ordinances down-zoning Acierno's property.  Abraham v. Pekarski, 
                     
10.  In Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1989), we 
held that members of a municipal planning board, acting pursuant 
to their governmental function as defined by state statute when 
making land use decisions, were absolutely immune in their 
individual capacities from a damage suit brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  Acierno does not allege that the members of the County 
Council were acting in a non-governmental function, e.g., outside 
of powers delegated to them by state law, when they enacted the 
two ordinances which down-zoned his property.  Therefore, for 
purposes of deciding this case, we will assume without deciding 
that the members of the County Council were acting within their 




728 F.2d 167, 174 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242, 104 S. 
Ct. 3513 (1984). 
 We have established a two-part test to determine 
whether actions are to be regarded as legislative for immunity 
purposes: (1) the action must be "substantively" legislative, 
which requires that it involve a policy-making or line-drawing 
decision; and (2) the action must be "procedurally" legislative, 
which requires that it be undertaken through established 
legislative procedures.  Ryan, 889 F.2d at 1290-91.  In order to 
provide a further inquiry to help define the first part of the 
Ryan test, we stated that decisions affecting a single individual 
or a small number of people do not implicate legislative power 
and, thus, such actions are administrative in nature.  Id. at 
1291.  Furthermore, in prior cases we have indicated that such an 
inquiry is an appropriate factor to consider when determining 
whether an action is legislative or administrative, see Donivan, 
835 F.2d at 488; Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 693-94 
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029, 101 S. Ct. 1737 
(1981), but we have not held this inquiry to be conclusive. 
 When the district court conducted its analysis under 
the first part of the Ryan test, it focused only on the factor of 
whether the action was directed toward a single individual or the 
community at large.  The district court stated, "legislative acts 
are those which apply generally to the entire community, whereas 
acts specifically directed at one or a few individuals are 
executive or administrative acts."  Acierno v. Cloutier, No. 92-
 
 
385, 1993 WL 215133, at *27 (D. Del. June 9, 1993).11  Based on 
the fact that passage of the two ordinances did not rezone any 
other landowner's property, the district court held that the 
County Council's actions with respect to Acierno's property were 
administrative in nature.  Id. 
 We believe the district court erred in its application 
of the "substantive prong" of the Ryan test by placing too much 
emphasis on the factor of whether the action was directed at a 
single individual or the community at large.  It is difficult to 
find fault with the district court, however, because we concede 
that the prior decisions of this court are somewhat unclear as to 
what are the relevant factors, and how much weight each should be 
given, in deciding whether zoning and other land use actions are 
substantively legislative or administrative in nature.  
Furthermore, there is a consistent thread running through the 
case law which indicates that courts often point to the narrow 
target of an action as indicative of an administrative, rather 
than legislative, act.  See, e.g., Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 
259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984)(planning board's decision "to insist on 
completion of a particular road before granting approval of a 
specific proposed subdivision" was an action based on specific 
                     
11.  The district court cited the following cases for this 
proposition: Donivan, 835 F.2d at 488; Rogin, 616 F.2d at 693; 
Ryan v. Burlington County, N.J., 708 F. Supp. 623, 640 (D.N.J.), 
aff'd, 889 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir. 1989); and de Botton v. Marple 
Township, 689 F. Supp. 477, 482-83 (E.D. Pa. 1988).  As we 
already stated, in Donivan and Rogin we did rely in part on this 
factor, but we did not hold that this inquiry is dispositive of 
the administrative/legislative determination. 
 
 
rather than legislative facts tending to single out specific 
individuals and affect them differently than others; thus, the 
action was administrative rather than legislative in nature); 
Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1422-23 (4th Cir. 
1983)(county council members who reviewed a specific building 
permit application assumed a non-legislative role); Jodeco, Inc. 
v. Hann, 674 F. Supp. 488, 495 (D.N.J. 1987)("Official acts 
affecting the community at-large might tip the balance in favor 
of a finding of legislative conduct, while acts directed at one 
or a few individuals might be dispositive of executive or 
administrative conduct."). 
 In Jodeco, the district court commented that there was 
no definitive standard in this circuit for distinguishing between 
legislative and non-legislative actions.  674 F. Supp. at 494-95.  
Although in Ryan we clarified the test somewhat by indicating 
that actions must be both substantively and procedurally 
legislative in nature in order to be entitled to absolute 
immunity, we believe that the "substantive prong" of the standard 
requires further elaboration.  To fill the gap which has been 
left open in our prior cases dealing with legislative immunity, 
we repeat the standard employed by the district court in Jodeco: 
 [In order to distinguish] legislative from non-
legislative functions, . . . the appropriate inquiry 
[is] whether the conduct of the defendant zoning 
officials involved either the enactment or amendment of 
zoning legislation or simply the enforcement of already 
existing zoning laws.  Acts performed pursuant to the 
former are legislative in character and the officials 
performing them are entitled to absolute immunity, 
while acts performed pursuant to the latter are 
administrative, executive, or ministerial and the 
officials performing them may only receive the 
 
 
protection of qualified immunity.  Factored into this 
equation should be the impact that such official 
conduct has on the citizens of the municipality.  
Official acts affecting the community at-large might 
tip the balance in favor of a finding of legislative 
conduct, while acts directed at one or a few 
individuals might be dispositive of executive or 
administrative conduct. 
674 F. Supp. at 494-95.  We have previously cited with approval 
the court's analysis in Jodeco concluding that members of 
planning boards in New Jersey are entitled to absolute immunity 
because their responsibilities "are so integrally related to the 
judicial process . . . ." Id. at 496.  See Bass v. Attardi, 868 
F.2d 45, 50 (3d Cir. 1989).  Likewise, we now adopt the court's 
analysis of the legislative/administrative determination as our 
own. 
 In the present case, the members of the County Council 
acted to down-zone Acierno's property through two separate, 
albeit related, actions.  The first action was the enactment of 
an ordinance on April 14, 1992 voiding the approved record 
development plan and related subdivision plans for the property.  
The second action was the enactment of an ordinance on September 
9, 1992 rezoning the property from DPUD to an R-1-B zoning 
classification.  Accordingly, we must consider each of these 
actions under the standard articulated above. 
  The enactment of the ordinance voiding the 
approved record development plan was undertaken by the County 
Council pursuant to the authority of the sunsetting provision of 
the County Code, § 23-81(18), which allows the Council to revoke 
development rights after the passage of ten years to ensure that 
 
 
facilities and infrastructure are sufficient.  This ordinance was 
passed in an effort to facilitate enforcement of existing zoning 
laws, not to facilitate enactment or amendment of new zoning laws 
involving broad-based policy or line-drawing determinations.  
Furthermore, the ordinance affected only one piece of property, 
and thus was aimed at only one landowner, Frank Acierno.  We thus 
conclude that the County Council's enactment of Ordinance 91-190 
on April 14, 1992, which voided the approved record development 
plan and related subdivision plans for the property, was an 
administrative, not legislative, action.  The members of the 
County Council are not entitled to legislative immunity with 
respect to this action.12 
 We now turn to the County Council's second action, the 
enactment of Substitute 1 to Ordinance 92-119 which rezoned the 
property from DPUD to an R-1-B zoning classification.  This 
action of rezoning the property was undertaken pursuant to the 
legislative powers delegated to the County Council under Delaware 
state law.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, §§ 2601-2614 (1989 & Supp. 
1992).  Furthermore, the rezoning of the property was 
accomplished through the ordinance procedure, which we have found 
necessary in order for the action to be substantively legislative 
in character.  Donivan, 835 F.2d at 488-89.  If not for the fact 
                     
12.  The parties disagree as to whether the entire rezoning 
process, which involved the enactment of the two ordinances, was 
accomplished consistently with all the procedures required by 
state law.  In light of our conclusion that the enactment of 
Ordinance 91-190 was not substantively legislative in character, 
we need not address whether this action also violated the 
"procedural prong" of the Ryan test. 
 
 
that the ordinance was aimed at one parcel of property and one 
landowner, the action would appear to be substantively 
legislative, not administrative, in nature. 
 Nevertheless, this case requires us to address the 
difficult question of whether a rezoning action that is otherwise 
substantively legislative in character is removed from the scope 
of actions protected by the absolute immunity doctrine merely 
because it was directed at one parcel of property.  In Ryan, we 
did state that "[w]here the decision affects a small number or a 
single individual, the legislative power is not implicated, and 
the act takes on the nature of administration."  889 F.2d at 
1291.  However, we did not intend this consideration as a bright-
line rule which automatically overrides other important 
indications that an action is substantively legislative in 
character.  Rather, we intended this consideration as a factor 
that is usually important but may not be dispositive of the 
administrative/legislative outcome.  This reading of Ryan is 
confirmed by the manner in which the Ryan court applied its test.  
While noting that the decision at issue "did not affect the 
community as a whole," the court went on to state that "[t]his is 
a strong indication that legislative line-drawing was not 
implicated."  Id.  Therefore, the Ryan court itself did not apply 
the factor that the decision was directed at a single individual 
or a small group as a dispositive consideration which trumps 
other relevant factors. 
 Although we have indicated that the factor of an action 
being directed at one property or one landowner is an important 
 
 
consideration, other courts have concluded that the rezoning of a 
single parcel of land to a less intensive use through the 
enactment of an ordinance is legislative activity.  See Fralin & 
Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Va., 474 F. Supp. 1315, 1320-
21 (E.D. Va. 1979)(members of planning board were engaged in 
legislation when acting to rezone a single parcel of property); 
Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237, 244 (D. 
Del. 1968)("the members of the County Council were acting within 
the scope of legitimate legislative activity when they voted to 
rezone plaintiff's property").  Delaware state law is to the same 
effect.  See Shellburne, Inc. v. Buck, 240 A.2d 757, 758 (Del. 
1968).  Furthermore, the cases in which the factor of the zoning 
ordinance being directed at only a single or few property owners 
has been dispositive of the administrative/legislative 
determination generally have been variance or special exception 
decisions, not rezoning decisions.  See, e.g., Rogin, 616 F.2d at 
693 n.60 (denial of use variance); Cutting, 724 F.2d at 261 
(subdivision approval); Scott, 716 F.2d at 1422-23 (denial of 
building permit); Jodeco, 674 F. Supp. at 496 (denial of variance 
applications). 
 Finally, we also believe that the members of a county 
legislature who enact a rezoning ordinance affecting only one 
property or landowner may still be acting in a policy-making or 
line-drawing manner.  In the present case, the subject property 
consisted of thirty-eight acres of unimproved land with an 
approved development plan calling for 322 apartment units and 
some commercial use.  Through the normal review process, specific 
 
 
concerns arose such as whether the development plan complied with 
wetlands regulations, the fire prevention code, and public works 
regulations, and that the project as planned may pose serious 
traffic and road access problems.  In response to these concerns 
and, ultimately, Acierno's failure to address all of them 
adequately in a timely fashion, the County Council acted to 
regulate the intensity of development on this fairly large parcel 
of land by passing the rezoning ordinance. 
 Under these circumstances, a blind adherence to the 
principle that legislation affecting a single property or owner 
is administrative rather than legislative would eviscerate the 
overarching aim of protecting local legislators from suit under 
the absolute immunity doctrine when they make broad policy 
decisions to further the communities in which they serve.  
Therefore, we hold that the members of the County Council in 
enacting Substitute 1 to Ordinance 92-119, which rezoned the 
property from DPUD to an R-1-B zoning classification, were acting 
in a substantively legislative manner.  Nevertheless, as we made 
clear in Ryan, the members of the County Council are not entitled 
to absolute legislative immunity for this action unless it was 
also procedurally legislative.  889 F.2d at 1290-91. 
 The enactment of Substitute 1 to Ordinance 92-119 was 
procedurally legislative if it was undertaken through established 
legislative procedures.  Id.  That is, the members of the County 
Council are entitled to absolute immunity for this action if they 
followed "the statutory procedures specified for such action."  
Abraham, 728 F.2d at 174.  Addressing the "procedural prong" of 
 
 
the Ryan test, the district court held that the members of the 
County Council failed to comply with specified statutory 
procedures in rezoning the property from DPUD to an R-1-B zoning 
classification.  Acierno v. Cloutier, No. 92-385, 1993 WL 215133, 
at *27 (D. Del. June 9, 1993).  Specifically, the district court 
found that the County Council violated title 9, section 1152(b) 
of the Delaware Code by enacting an ordinance which had been 
"amended as to [a] matter of substance which [was] not embraced 
within the title of the ordinance" without subjecting the 
ordinance "to all of the procedures . . . required in the case of 
a newly introduced ordinance."  Id. at *28 (quoting Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 9, § 1152(b)). 
 Acierno took issue with the procedure employed to 
rezone his property because the County Council ultimately adopted 
an ordinance rezoning the property to an R-1-B classification, 
while bracketed language below the title of the originally 
proposed ordinance, for which the County Council had complied 
with all requisite procedures, stated that the ordinance would 
rezone the property to an R-2 classification.  In the district 
court, the members of the County Council argued that this change 
did not affect the title of the ordinance and, in any event, was 
not a material amendment because the R-1-B zoning classification 
is less restrictive than the R-2 zoning classification.  The 
district court rejected these arguments because the very purpose 
of the ordinance was to change the zoning classification, and 
because the actual language which was changed was part of the 
 
 
title of the ordinance and was not for informational purposes 
only. 
 On appeal, the members of the County Council argue that 
the district court's "technical objection" to the allegedly 
deficient notice does not prevent members of municipal 
legislative bodies from establishing legislative immunity.  We 
reject the notion that our decision in Abraham stands for the 
broad proposition that a mere technical violation of the 
statutory procedures specified for legislative action, by itself, 
converts an otherwise legislative action into an administrative 
action.  Rather, in Abraham, we looked to the failure to follow 
procedures established by state law, which were required to be 
followed in order to legislate, as indicative that a township 
board had invoked its managerial powers in dismissing an 
employee.  728 F.2d at 174-75.  Thus, we viewed the compliance 
with statutory procedures as a prerequisite for finding an action 
legislative in character, but we did not hold that a mere 
technical violation of a statutory procedure would have the 
effect of converting an otherwise legislative action into an 
administrative action to which absolute immunity does not apply. 
 Addressing the "procedural prong" of the immunity 
determination, in Ryan we stated that "[t]his principle requires 
that constitutionally accepted procedures of enacting the 
legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act is a 
legitimate, reasoned decision representing the will of the people 
which the governing body has been chosen to serve."  889 F.2d at 
1291.  In the present case, it is undisputed that the members of 
 
 
the County Council followed all the statutory procedures required 
in order to enact an ordinance: (1) a legal notice of the 
proposed zoning ordinance was published; (2) a public hearing was 
held before the Department of Planning and Planning Board; and 
(3) the adopted ordinance, though amended during the Planning 
Board hearing, was enacted by vote at a public meeting of the 
County Council.  Even though the version of the ordinance 
ultimately enacted, Substitute 1 to Ordinance 92-119, was not 
formally put through all the statutory procedures after the 
amendment was agreed upon at the public hearing held before the 
Department of Planning and Planning Board, we believe that the 
members of the County Council engaged in legislative activity and 
took the steps necessary to rezone the property in compliance 
with Delaware law. 
 We also believe there to be an important distinction 
between general adherence to legislative procedure for the 
purposes of taking legislative action as a matter of federal law, 
as opposed to full compliance with all technical requirements for 
such legislative action to be valid under state or county law.  
It may well be that if in fact state law required the substitute 
to the originally proposed ordinance to also go through all the 
statutorily required notice procedures and hearings, then Acierno 
would be able to successfully attack the validity of Substitute 1 
to Ordinance 92-119 in an administrative or state court 
proceeding.  But the fact that Acierno may have an alternative 
remedy based on an alleged failure of the legislative body to 
follow state-mandated procedures does not mean that, as a matter 
 
 
of federal law, the resulting action is transformed from one that 
is procedurally legislative into one that is not. 
 Therefore, we hold that in making the determination of 
whether a particular action was procedurally legislative or not, 
the court need only be satisfied that the municipal body is 
acting pursuant to the basic legislative procedure.  In the 
present case, we find no indication in the record that the 
members of the County Council bypassed state-mandated procedures 
in bad faith when enacting Substitute 1 to Ordinance 92-119.  
Rather, the record reflects that the County Council followed the 
ordinance procedure, published notice of its intended action, and 
held the appropriate public hearings before enacting the rezoning 
ordinance.  Consequently, we hold that the district court erred 
in holding that a possible violation of the publication notice 
requirement destroyed the legislative character of the County 
Council's act of enacting Substitute 1 to Ordinance 92-119.13 
                     
13.  The members of the County Council also argue that their 
action of rezoning the property did not violate the "procedural 
prong" of the Ryan test (1) because that portion of the ordinance 
which indicated the precise zone the property would be changed to 
was not part of the title of the ordinance, and thus was not a 
material alteration; (2) because Acierno does not have standing 
to complain since he attended and participated in the public 
hearings; (3) because he was not prejudiced since the R-1-B 
zoning classification allows for more intensive development than 
the R-2 zoning classification; and (4) because the remedy that 
the district court's ruling would require -- a return to the 
Planning Board for review and subsequent republication -- would 
be unnecessarily duplicative since it made the recommendation 
that the proposed ordinance be amended in the first place.  In 
light of our conclusion that the enactment of Substitute 1 to 
Ordinance 92-119 was procedurally legislative, we need not 
address these contentions. 
 
 
 In sum, we conclude that the members of the County 
Council are entitled to absolute legislative immunity for 
rezoning Acierno's property through the enactment of Substitute 1 
to Ordinance 92-119 because that action was substantively and 
procedurally legislative in character.  Nevertheless, the members 
of the County Council are not entitled to legislative immunity 
for the enactment of Ordinance 91-190, which voided the approved 
record development plan and related subdivision plans for the 
property, because that action was administrative in nature, not 
legislative.  We will reverse in part, and affirm in part, that 
part of the district court's order denying the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on legislative immunity grounds.  Therefore, 
we must address whether the members of the County Council are 
entitled to protection under the more limited doctrine of 
qualified immunity for their action voiding the approved record 
development plan for the property. 
 
 B. 
 Addressing the defendants' claim of entitlement to 
qualified immunity from suit requires us to determine whether 
Acierno possessed a "clearly established" constitutional right to 
develop his property which was abrogated by the County Council 
through the action of voiding his record development plan and 
subdivision plan.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 
S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982).  In his amended complaint, Acierno 
alleges that he had a vested right to develop the property 
pursuant to the DPUD zoning classification and the approved 
 
 
record development plan.  The district court agreed with Acierno 
and found that his vested right to develop the property arose 
from independent Delaware state and County law sources.  However, 
our review of County law and Delaware state law reveals that if 
Acierno did possess a vested right to develop his property as 
zoned, that right was not so "clearly established" as to strip 
the members of the County Council and First Assistant County 
Attorney Mitchell from an entitlement to qualified immunity.  
Thus, we will reverse the district court's denial of the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds for the members of the County Council, and its denial of 
Mitchell's motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. 
 When considering whether members of local legislative 
bodies are entitled to immunity from suit, we have recognized 
that there is a compelling need for such a protective doctrine 
because of the severe chilling effect numerous suits for damages 
would have on prospective officials.  See Jodeco, Inc. v. Hann, 
674 F. Supp. 488, 493 (D.N.J. 1987)(cited with approval in Bass 
v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1989)).  We also believe 
that adherence to the immunity doctrine is necessary in order to 
allow elected and appointed officials to make intelligent land 
use decisions without the constant fear of litigation infecting 
the decision-making process.  Bass, 868 F.2d at 50 n.11 (quoting 
Anastasio v. Planning Bd., 209 N.J. Super. 499, 526, 507 A.2d 
1194, 1208, certification denied, 107 N.J. 46, 526 A.2d 136 
(1986)).  Recognizing similar concerns, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that the qualified immunity defense has evolved to 
 
 
provide "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law."  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986); see also Schrob I, 948 
F.2d 1402, 1421 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court announced 
that the test for determining whether government officials are 
entitled to qualified immunity for their actions involves an 
objective, rather than subjective, inquiry.  457 U.S. at 815-18, 
102 S. Ct. at 2736-38.  The Supreme Court stated, "government 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  Id. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2738; see also Burns v. County 
of Cambria, Pa., 971 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 1049 (1993). 
 Subsequently, the Supreme Court has clarified that the 
first inquiry in considering a claim to entitlement to qualified 
immunity is to examine whether the plaintiff has "allege[d] the 
violation of a clearly established constitutional right."  
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793 
(1991); see supra note 7.  In a recent discussion of the "clearly 
established" right aspect of the qualified immunity 
determination, we stated: 
 The right an official is alleged to have violated must 
have been "clearly established" in a "particularized" 
sense.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. [635,] 640, 107 
S. Ct. [3034,] 3039 [(1987)].  That is, "[t]he contours 
of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
 
 
reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates that right."  Id.  Thus, qualified 
immunity does not apply if "reasonable officials in the 
defendants' position at the relevant time could have 
believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, 
that their conduct would be unlawful."  Good v. Dauphin 
County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 
1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 When complaining of a violation of substantive due 
process rights, a plaintiff must prove that the governmental 
authority acted to "infringe[] a property interest encompassed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment."  Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 679 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, __ 
U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992).  As the Supreme Court has 
previously stated: 
 Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution.  Rather they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source 
such as state law--rules or understandings that secure 
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement 
to those benefits. 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 
(1972). 
 Thus, as the district court did in this case, when 
analyzing substantive due process claims courts are required to 
turn to state and local law to determine whether the plaintiff 
possessed a property interest which was abrogated by the 
governmental action.  The question of whether the property 
interest requirement has been met is generally a matter of law 
for the court to decide.  RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated 
 
 
Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 893, 110 S. Ct. 240 (1989). 
 In denying the defendants their claim to entitlement to 
qualified immunity, the district court first found that Acierno 
had a protected property interest.  The court concluded that 
Acierno had a protected property interest in both the approved 
record development plan and the DPUD zoning classification, and 
that this property interest was independently derived from both 
New Castle County and Delaware state law sources.  Since the 
district court addressed Acierno's property interest as arising 
from these independent sources, we will follow suit in our 
discussion. 
 The district court first determined that Acierno had a 
vested right pursuant to County law.  For purposes of this 
analysis, the court assumed that the County Council had relied 
upon the repealed "five-year sunset provision" of the County 
Code, § 23-81(21)(repealed 1987), as the authority for its power 
to void the record development plan.  Assuming that provision was 
properly applied, the district court concluded that it gave 
Acierno "a legitimate claim of entitlement to the continuing 
validity of the record plan and the zoning classification to 
which it related, and to develop the [p]roperty consistent 
therewith."  Acierno v. Cloutier, No. 92-385, 1993 WL 215133, at 
*10 (D. Del. June 9, 1993).  The district court reached this 
conclusion on the grounds that as a factual matter the record 
plan which was voided in April, 1992 was the subdivision plan 
approved and recorded in December, 1988, and that the County 
 
 
Council had no discretion whatsoever to act until, at the 
earliest, the expiration of the five-year sunset period. 
 First, the district court indicated that by reason of a 
legal memorandum issued in 1986, the County Council knew that its 
discretion to void a record plan did not even come into existence 
until the Planning Department made such a recommendation.  The 
district court concluded that Acierno had a property interest 
arising from a legitimate claim of absolute entitlement to 
develop the property consistent with the approved record plan and 
DPUD zoning classification during the five-year sunset period 
beginning from the date the plan was approved in December, 1988.  
In addition, the court concluded that he had a property interest 
arising from a legitimate claim of entitlement to develop the 
property without interference from the County after the 
expiration of the five-year sunset period but before the Planning 
Department made a formal recommendation to void the record plan.  
Finally, the court determined that if the repealed five-year 
sunset provision did not apply, but rather the ten-year sunset 
provision contained in current County Code § 23-81(18) was 
applicable, Acierno had a property interest arising from a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to develop the property without 
interference from the County because the current ten-year sunset 
provision contains no language providing the County with 
authority to void record development plans. 
 The defendants argue that the district court's analysis 
is flawed because a landowner does not obtain a vested right to 
develop property before acquiring a building permit and 
 
 
commencing construction through some ground-breaking activity.  
Furthermore, they contend that the district court failed to 
appreciate the important distinction between Acierno's record 
development plan, originally recorded in 1974, and the 
subsequently filed subdivision plans which were submitted and 
recorded in 1986 and 1988.  The defendants argue that the five-
year sunset provision governs, and that if the five-year sunset 
provision had been applied from the date the PUD record 
development plan was approved in 1974, the district court would 
have concluded that Acierno had no vested right to develop his 
property based on County law because the County properly 
exercised its discretion to void the record development plan well 
after the five-year sunset period expired in 1979. 
 The district court also found that Acierno had acquired 
a property interest under the applicable Delaware state law 
doctrines of vested rights and equitable estoppel.  The 
defendants argued in the district court that Delaware follows the 
majority rule of state courts and requires a developer to obtain 
a building permit and to commence some ground breaking activity 
before a vested right to develop attaches.  This rule of vested 
rights, which is known as the "permit plus rule," was recognized 
by the Delaware Supreme Court: 
  It is generally recognized that the issuance of a 
building permit does not, alone, confer any right 
against a later zoning change.  Otherwise stated, a 
permit is not per se protected against a zoning change 
subsequently adopted.  The acquisition of vested rights 
requires more.  As of the time of the zoning change, 
there must have been a substantial change of position, 
expenditures, or incurrence of obligations, made 
lawfully and in good faith under the permit, before the 
 
 
land owner becomes entitled to complete the 
construction and to use the premises for a purpose 
prohibited by a subsequent zoning change.  This is the 
rule supported by a great majority of the cases. 
Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 224 A.2d 250, 254 (Del. 1966). 
 Apparently seizing on the Delaware Supreme Court's 
inclusion of the word "alone," the district court read this 
passage as indicating that the vested rights rule in Delaware 
does not preclude property owners from acquiring a vested right 
to develop as long as there has been a substantial change of 
position or expenditure, even though they have not obtained a 
building permit.  In support of this interpretation of the 
Delaware rule, the district court turned to several cases in 
which the Delaware courts had subsequently applied the vested 
rights and equitable estoppel doctrines "to a broad range of 
circumstances."  Acierno v. Cloutier, No. 92-385, 1993 WL 215133, 
at *12 (D. Del. June 9, 1993). 
 In particular, the district court focused on two 
unreported cases from the lower state courts which it read as 
refuting the defendants' contention that under Delaware law a 
landowner has no vested right to continue development after an 
adverse zoning change unless prior to the change he had obtained 
a building permit and materially changed his position in reliance 
thereon.  See Wilmington Materials, Inc. v. Town of Middleton, 
Civ. A. No. 10392, 1988 WL 135507, at *6-9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 
1988)(relying on the equitable estoppel and vested rights 
doctrines, the court enjoined town from enforcing a zoning 
amendment to prevent the development of a property even though no 
 
 
permit had been issued); New Castle County v. Mitchell, Civ. A. 
No. 6231, 1981 WL 15144, at *3-7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 1981)(because 
property owner had begun renovations to make his property 
suitable for an adult entertainment center and had applied for a 
building permit before the planned location was rezoned to a 
classification in which such uses were not allowed, the court 
determined that the property owner had acquired a vested right 
and that the principle of equitable estoppel entitled the 
plaintiff to continue his business at that location). 
 The district court then discussed an unpublished 
criminal decision in order to refute the defendants' claim that 
the above unpublished cases are inconsistent with Shellburne and 
other relevant Delaware Supreme Court precedent.  See State v. 
Raley, Cr. A. No. S90-07-0002, 1991 WL 18114 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 8, 1991), aff'd without opinion, 604 A.2d 418 (Del. 1991).14 
 The defendants argue on appeal that the common law rule 
of vested rights set forth in Shellburne, the "permit plus" rule, 
is the law of Delaware and a majority of other states.  While a 
minority of jurisdictions confer a vested right at the time 
application for a building permit is made, a majority of states 
have adopted the view that a developer must possess a building 
permit and make a substantial change in position or expenditures, 
                     
14.  In Raley, the state charged the defendant with violating 
certain Delaware Marina Facility Regulations enacted after he 
received an administrative permit.  Citing Wilmington Materials 
and Mitchell, the court concluded that the vested rights doctrine 
in Delaware did not give the defendant a constitutional right to 




or incur substantial obligations in reliance thereon, in order 
for rights to vest.  4 Arden H. Rathkopf et al., Rathkopf's The 
Law of Zoning and Planning § 50.03, at 50-12, 50-25 (4th ed. 
1975).  Moreover, in some states specific statutes, regulations, 
or zoning ordinances themselves confer rights upon developers 
already engaged in developing their property to remain exempt 
from zoning code or regulations changes for a period of time and 
to acquire vested rights by subsequent action.  Id. § 50.02, at 
50-5 to -9. 
 The defendants further contend that the "permit plus" 
rule adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Shellburne has been 
reaffirmed by that court and several lower state courts.  See 
Mayor of New Castle v. Rollins Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 475 
A.2d 355, 360 (Del. 1984)(in banc)(In Shellburne "we held that a 
property owner has no vested right in a zoning classification, 
and that a building permit does not, per se, confer any right 
against a later zoning change.  But we ruled that under certain 
circumstances, such as where an owner had made a substantial 
change of position or a substantial expenditure, a vested right 
arises from good faith reliance upon a building permit."); Miller 
v. Board of Adjustment, 521 A.2d 642, 647 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(vested right requires a permit plus a change of position); 
Willdel Realty, Inc. v. New Castle County, 270 A.2d 174, 178 
(Del. Ch. 1970), aff'd, 281 A.2d 612 (Del. 1971); Barrows v. City 
of Lewes, Civ. A. No. 83C-MR 32, slip op. at 3 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 27, 1985)("The issuance of a building permit is the first 
prerequisite of such a [vested rights] claim based on financial 
 
 
detriment.  A fortiori, when a building permit is not issued, 
indeed, when an application for such a permit is not made, 
plaintiff has no right, vested or otherwise, to construct 
anything on his property.").  The defendants argue that the 
district court was obliged to follow the majority vested rights 
rule of "permit plus" as articulated by the highest court in 
Delaware and not as stated in unreported lower court decisions 
which are to the contrary.  See Colantuno v. Aetna Ins. Co., 980 
F.2d 908, 909 (3d Cir. 1992)("[W]hen federal courts are required 
to interpret or apply state law, we consider and accept the 
decisions of the state's highest court as the ultimate authority 
of state law."). 
 The defendants characterize the district court's 
holding as improperly recognizing that once a property owner has 
record development and subdivision plans approved, the 
municipality is estopped from enacting any zoning changes which 
would abrogate the developer's vested rights even in the absence 
of any construction activity or other detrimental reliance.  
According to the defendants, recognition of such a vested rights 
doctrine is contrary to Delaware law and other reported land use 
decisions.  See L.M. Everhart Constr., Inc. v. Jefferson County 
Planning Comm'n, 2 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 1993).  In L.M. Everhart 
Construction, the plaintiff argued that Planning Commission 
approval of a subdivision plat created an absolute vested right 
to develop the parcel as approved.  Rejecting this argument, the 
court stated that it was "tantamount to an assertion that, once 
approved, a subdivision plat is exempt from all future zoning and 
 
 
subdivision regulations.  We can find no court that has adopted 
such a broad conception of vested rights."  Id.15 
 Finally, the defendants also attack the district 
court's reliance on the doctrine of equitable estoppel for its 
finding that Acierno had a vested right to develop his property 
as zoned.  They contend that an equitable estoppel claim cannot 
form the basis for a legitimate claim of entitlement so as to 
support the existence of a property right as required in a § 1983 
substantive due process action.  In Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991 
F.2d 100 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 182 
(1993), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed 
whether a state court order of equity estopping a municipality 
from denying a special exception from a zoning ordinance 
represented a legal claim of entitlement.  The Biser court 
rejected the plaintiff's argument that a state court order based 
on equitable estoppel could create a state-law property interest: 
 In order to justify substantive due process protection, 
the legal right to a permit must exist before the local 
agency denies the permit application -- the claim of 
entitlement must come from "an existing legislative or 
administrative standard."  Dean Tarry Corp. v. 
Friedlander, 826 F.2d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 1987)(emphasis 
added).  Equitable estoppel does not recognize a pre-
                     
15.  The defendants also argue that the district court's 
interpretation of the doctrine of vested rights would obviate the 
need for a statutory provision enacted by New Castle County which 
addresses the rights of developers at the subdivision approval 
stage.  Under County Code § 23-6, the approval of a subdivision 
plan protects the planned development against subsequent zoning 
changes for a period of three years.  New Castle County, Del., 
Code § 23-6.  The ordinance voiding Acierno's record development 
plan was enacted in April, 1992, more than three years after the 
most recent subdivision plan for the property was approved and 
filed in December, 1988. 
 
 
existing legal right; rather, estoppel bars a defendant 
from asserting a legal right that it would otherwise be 
entitled to enforce, based on that party's conduct. 
991 F.2d at 104. 
 What the above discussion concerning the district 
court's decision and the defendants' arguments on appeal 
demonstrates to us is that the vested rights law of both New 
Castle County and the State of Delaware at the time the County 
Council enacted Ordinance 91-190 was subject to considerable 
uncertainty and differing interpretations.  While we decline to 
take a position as to whether the district court's prediction of 
what the Delaware Supreme Court would hold concerning vested 
rights, the "permit plus" rule, and equitable estoppel is correct 
as a matter of law, we do not believe that Acierno's property 
interest was "clearly established" under New Castle County and 
Delaware law at the time Ordinance 91-190 was enacted in 1992.  
Therefore, even if we were to conclude that the Delaware courts 
would agree substantially with the district court's analysis of 
vested rights, Acierno's property interest, if any existed, was 
not so "clearly established" as to strip the members of the 
County Council and Mitchell of their qualified immunity defenses. 
 In Anderson v. Creighton, the Supreme Court articulated 
the "clearly established" standard: 
 The contours of the [constitutional] right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.  
This is not to say that an official action is protected 
by qualified immunity unless the very action in 
question has previously been held unlawful, but it is 
to say that in the light of pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent. 
 
 
483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987)(citations 
omitted).  We further clarified that this qualified immunity 
question involves two governing inquiries: 
 First, in order for the governing law to be 
sufficiently well established for immunity to be 
denied, it is not necessary that there have been a 
previous precedent directly in point . . . .  The 
ultimate issue is whether, despite the absence of a 
case applying established principles to the same facts, 
reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the 
relevant time could have believed, in light of what was 
in the decided case law, that their conduct would be 
lawful.  Second, even where the officials clearly 
should have been aware of the governing legal 
principles, they are nevertheless entitled to immunity 
if based on the information available to them they 
could have believed their conduct would be consistent 
with those principles. 
Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 
F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989).16 
 Applying this test in the present case, we need go no 
further than the first inquiry because we believe that reasonable 
county officials in Delaware charged with legislating and 
enforcing the New Castle County zoning scheme in 1992 could have 
believed that their action of voiding Acierno's record 
development plan was lawful.  We come to this conclusion for 
several reasons. 
 First, we agree with the defendants that the highest 
court in Delaware has provided no clearer discussion of the 
                     
16.  Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects the 
actions of municipal officials except when they act in a "plainly 
incompetent" manner or when they "knowingly violate the law."  
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096 
(1986); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 
1993); Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1421 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
 
vested rights doctrine since Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, and 
that case adopts the restrictive, majority rule that vested 
rights do not attach without a "permit plus."17  The Delaware 
Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed the "permit plus" rule.  
See Rollins Outdoor Advertising, 475 A.2d at 360.  Furthermore, 
published decisions of lower state courts in Delaware are to the 
same effect.  E.g., Miller, 521 A.2d at 647; Shellburne, Inc. v. 
Conner, 315 A.2d 620, 622 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd, 336 A.2d 568 
(Del. 1975).  Thus, Mitchell and the members of the County 
Council could have reasonably believed that they were lawfully 
acting to void Acierno's record development plan because he did 
not have a vested right to develop without first obtaining a 
building permit. 
 Second, the district court's analysis ultimately rests 
on a belief that the law of vested rights in Delaware has evolved 
beyond the "permit plus" rule and now involves a focus on whether 
the property owner suffered sufficient substantial reliance to 
have development rights vest.  Even though the district court's 
conclusion was wholly derived from unpublished decisions, we 
believe that if the Delaware law has truly developed in this 
manner, the discretionary aspect of the determination of whether 
rights have vested supports our conclusion that reasonable zoning 
                     
17.  Moreover, the case apparently downplays the possibility that 
vested rights can attach solely through detrimental reliance, 
absent obtaining a building permit: "The plaintiff concedes that 
a property owner has no vested right in a zoning classification.  
This rule is not changed by financial detriment."  Shellburne, 
Inc., 224 A.2d at 254 (emphasis added). 
 
 
officials could have believed that enactment of the voiding 
ordinance was a lawful action.  We also note that in the very 
case the district court relied upon to conclude the Delaware law 
had developed in this manner, State v. Raley, Cr. A. No. S90-07-
0002, 1991 WL 18114 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1991), the property 
owner had already obtained a permit, which significantly 
undermines the court's reliance on this case as a source of 
authority for its reading of the law. 
 Third, the complex nature of the body of law which 
underlies the vested rights doctrine leads us to conclude that, 
in certain circumstances, even municipal officials who act in an 
unlawful manner may have reasonably believed they were acting 
lawfully.  Commentators have recognized that the subject of 
vested rights 
 is one of the most troublesome areas of land use 
regulation . . . .  Its solution has required the 
reconciliation of the doctrine of separation of powers 
with the constitutional requirements of substantive due 
process, a balancing of interests of the public as a 
whole and those of the individual property owners, and, 
in many cases, the element of good faith and bad faith 
and the resort to equity and equitable principles. 
4 Rathkopf, supra, § 50.01, at 50-2.  When making land use 
decisions which involve the rezoning of a developer's property, 
local officials must analyze this complex body of law in order to 
ascertain whether a particular action will clearly abrogate a 
vested right the developer has acquired.  The doctrine of 
qualified immunity is designed to protect reasonable officials in 
the exercise of their duties, which in the case of local 
legislators and administrators charged with making land use and 
 
 
zoning decisions often involves interpreting complicated issues 
of state and county law. 
 Therefore, we hold that under the vested rights 
doctrine as recognized in Delaware, Acierno's property interest, 
if any in fact existed, was not so clearly established as to 
defeat the members of the County Council and Mitchell of their 
claims to qualified immunity for their actions leading to the 
enactment of Ordinance 91-190.  In addition, we also conclude 
that the law of equitable estoppel cannot provide the basis for a 
property interest which supports a substantive due process claim 
under § 1983 in federal court.  Any claim of entitlement must 
derive from an existing legislative or administrative standard.  
Biser, 991 F.2d at 104.  Although Acierno might be able to 
proceed directly against the County under a theory of equitable 
estoppel in order to attack the validity of the rezoning process, 
it does not support his damage claim brought pursuant to § 1983 
in federal court.  Finally, without undertaking a complete 
analysis of whether Acierno might prevail in attacking the 
validity of Ordinance 91-190 because the County Council may have 
relied on an unadopted ordinance as the source for its authority, 
County law cannot provide the basis for vitiating the defendants' 
entitlement to qualified immunity because the issue was not 
settled under County law at the time they acted.18 
                     
18.  With respect to this issue we note that we have found no 
reported state or federal cases which construe the DPUD ordinance 
provisions at issue in this case.  We also note that the district 
court did not conclude that the five-year sunset provision was 
not applicable; it merely concluded that the County Council 





 In sum, with respect to the members of the County 
Council, the order of the district court denying their motion for 
summary judgment on legislative immunity and qualified immunity 
grounds will be reversed.  The members of the County Council are 
entitled to legislative immunity for their action rezoning 
Acierno's property by enacting Substitute No. 1 to Ordinance 92-
119.  They are entitled to qualified immunity for voiding 
Acierno's record development and subdivision plans by enacting 
Ordinance 91-190.  Finally, the order of the district court 
denying First Assistant County Attorney Mitchell's motion to 
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds also will be reversed.   
 
(..continued) 
development plan.  Our review of this issue leads us to conclude 
that even if the County Council did rely on an unadopted 
ordinance, reliance on the appropriate ordinance would have 
resulted in the same result--application of the five-year sunset 
provision which allows a record plan to be voided upon the 
recommendation of the Department of Planning.  We reject any 
indication in the district court's opinion supporting the 
principle that the unknowing reliance on unadopted legislation as 
authority for an action should result in a per se denial of the 
qualified immunity defense. 
